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Abstract
Private sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom have the contractual freedom to organise their own sports tribunals 
and disputes procedures. There is no legislation in the UK that governs the form of a sports governing body’s dispute reso-
lution procedure. The common law and, to a certain extent, other industry measures influence the structure of a disputes 
procedure within a private sports governing body. When establishing dispute resolution systems in self-regulating indus-
tries, there is potential for structural conflicts of interest to arise. Reporting mechanisms and adjudicatory processes may 
be structurally bias through, for example, the way appointments are made to a dispute resolution panel. There may be the 
suggestion of implicit bias of panel members because of the interests that control the appointment process. Even if no actual 
bias arises, the perception of bias can damage the engagement of stakeholders in a dispute process and damage the reputation 
of the sport with sponsors or the general public. The key is to minimise structural conflicts of interest and ensure that the 
process is independent and impartial. This article examines the challenges faced with organising sports dispute resolution 
procedures, the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and highlights the important fac-
tors that a sports governing body should consider when designing an independent and impartial dispute resolution system. 
It concludes with a discussion of whether the legal basis for sports dispute resolution in the UK requires reconsideration to 
provide certainty, independence, impartiality and, above all, to guarantee a fair hearing.
"…even appearances may be of a certain importance 
or, in other words, ‘justice must not only be done, it 
must also be seen to be done’. What is at stake is the 
confidence which the courts in a democratic society 
must inspire in the public.”1
1 Introduction
There are different models of sports dispute resolution sys-
tems in the United Kingdom (UK). Dispute procedures will 
also be found in athletes’ contracts or the constitutional 
documents of sports leagues. It is a fragmented dispute reso-
lution system and procedures differ between sports. Some 
sports governing bodies may use arbitration as a dispute res-
olution procedure;2 a few encourage mediation. Some refer 
disputes to Sport Resolutions UK, a private dispute resolu-
tion service that administers investigations, appoints panels 
to hear disputes and case manages proceedings to provide an 
independent sports dispute process. Howsoever organised, in 
the regulatory model of sport favoured in the UK, a dispute 
resolution system will be enshrined in a sport’s regulatory 
framework and those who participate in the sport, whether 
amateur or professional, athlete, volunteer, coach, umpire or 
club, will be subject to the sport’s rules and procedures as a 
condition of participation.
There is no legislation in the UK that governs the form 
of a sports governing body’s dispute resolution procedure.3 
Instead, the common law and, to a certain extent, other 
 * Leanne O’Leary 
 olearyl@edgehill.ac.uk
1 Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UK
1 Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland App nos 40575/10 and 67474/10 
(ECtHR, 2 October 2018), para 143.
2 See, for example: Rule K Agreement to Arbitration in The Rules 
of the Association, Part X of the FA Handbook 2019/2020); Eng-
land and County Cricket Board, Cricket Discipline Commission 
Regulations, regulation 10 Appeals Procedure; and clause 14 of the 
approved Boxer/Manager Agreement by the British Boxing Board of 
Control (BBBC) and regulations 24, 26 and 28 of the BBBC Rules 
and Regulations.
3 Only a few countries have enacted national legislation that under-
pins a tribunal or forum independent of a sport’s regulatory frame-
work to resolve disputes in the sports sector. See, for example: The 
Sports Tribunal of New Zealand established under the Sports Anti-
Doping Act 2006 (NZ); the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Can-
ada established under the Physical Activity and Sport Act (Canada); 
and the National Sports Tribunal in Australia: National Sports Tribu-
nal Act 2019.
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industry measures may influence the form of a dispute reso-
lution structure within a sports governing body. Examples 
of other measures include good governance principles and 
the requirements of the World Anti-Doping Code.4 National 
good governance initiatives in the UK focus on the regula-
tory decision-making process (of which establishing a dis-
pute resolution system is a part) and the financial aspects 
of a sport’s administration, although none refer to, or offer 
guidance on, the minimum standards required of a sports 
dispute resolution procedure. Designing a dispute resolution 
system independent of a sports governing body should be 
a routine part of good governance practices in sport; it may 
even need to be supported by a requirement under national 
legislation.
The dispute resolution procedures in the sports indus-
try deal with a breadth of disciplinary matters and other 
disputes, ranging from a complex match-fixing allegation 
or safeguarding issue to a straightforward contract dispute. 
Some disputes may be of high monetary value, involve a 
determination of someone’s continued participation in the 
industry or touch on sensitive issues that also form the basis 
of a criminal prosecution. Some disputes may be of little 
monetary value. Sports disputes also attract media atten-
tion that can bring additional pressures on processes and for 
those involved in them. Organising an independent dispute 
resolution system can be costly for some sports, even with 
the assistance of volunteers. There may also be concerns 
about resourcing or the expertise to investigate disciplinary 
cases, particularly cases involving sexual abuse or match-
fixing.5 It is important, therefore, that a dispute resolution 
procedure, whether regulatory or contractual, has the appro-
priate procedural safeguards in place to balance the interests 
and rights of all involved.
It is not unusual for a self-regulating industry to police 
itself; in fact, it is expected.6 However, in self-regulating 
industries such as the sports industry, there is potential for 
structural conflicts of interest to arise. Reporting mecha-
nisms and adjudicatory processes may be structurally bias 
through, for example, the way appointments are made to 
a dispute resolution panel. There may be a suggestion of 
implicit bias of panel members because of the interests that 
control the appointment process. Even if no actual bias 
arises, the perception of bias can damage the engagement 
of stakeholders in a dispute process and the reputation of the 
sport with sponsors or the general public. There is a broader 
public interest of ensuring that athletes, volunteers and oth-
ers who are subject to a sports governing body’s regulation 
have an independent and impartial disputes resolution sys-
tem that is fair. The key is to minimise the structural con-
flicts of interest that can arise and to ensure that the process 
is independent and impartial.
This article examines the requirements for an independent 
and impartial dispute resolution system in the sports indus-
try. It commences with a discussion of the challenges faced 
with organising sports dispute resolution procedures, consid-
ers the requirements of Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR) and highlights the important 
factors that a sports governing body should consider when 
designing an independent and impartial dispute resolution 
system. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of whether 
in light of the recent decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Mutu and Pechstein v Switzer-
land7 and Ali Riza and Others v Turkey,8 sports resolution 
procedures in the UK should be underpinned by statute.
2  The challenge of dispute resolution 
design in the sports industry
Private sports’ governing bodies in the UK have the con-
tractual freedom to organise their own sports tribunals and 
disputes procedures. If the system is set up as an arbitra-
tion procedure, then the procedure will be supervised by 
the Arbitration Act 1996. If the system is not an arbitral 
procedure, then in England and Wales, the supervisory juris-
diction of the High Court has oversight of sports discipli-
nary decisions.9 Alternative dispute resolution is favoured 
as a mechanism for resolving disputes in the sports industry. 
Those with industry expertise can be appointed to adjudi-
cate, resolution is generally quick and costs are relatively 
low (although with some disputes where the loss of eco-
nomic rights is high, costs may escalate and the matter take 
time to resolve).
5 MA Weston (2017) 445.
6 J Black (1996).
7 App nos 40575/10 and 67474/10 (ECtHR, 2 October 2018).
8 App nos 30226/10 and 4 Others (ECtHR, 28 January 2020).
9 See Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1117; Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; 
and Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 
1192 (CA).
4 See the UK Sport Code of Sports Governance available on the 
UK Sport website at < https:// www. ukspo rt. gov. uk/ resou rces/ gover 
nance- code>; Sport and Recreation Principles of Good Govern-
ance <https:// www. sport andre creat ion. org. uk/ gover nance/ the- princ 
iples- of- good- gover nance>; and World Anti-Doping Code Interna-
tional Standard Result Management (January 2021), sections 8 and 
10 that require first instance anti-doping offences to be heard before 
an operationally independent tribunal and appeals to be held before 
an institutionally independent tribunal. Note also principle 7 of the 
EU Good Governance Principles compiled by the Working Group on 
Good Governance that was a part of the European Union (EU) Work-
ing Plan for Sport, in October 2013.
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Alternative dispute resolution processes are normally 
voluntary. There is a commonly held view that the parties 
to a voluntary dispute resolution process may be more satis-
fied with the outcome, have stronger feelings of procedural 
justice and control over the process, with a consequential 
benefit to post-settlement compliance and in respect of on-
going relationships, a more durable relationship than when 
a resolution is imposed.10 Research into the issue of volun-
tary dispute resolution processes as compared to imposed 
dispute resolution processes is limited and the superiority of 
a consensual process when compared to a non-consensual 
one is not universally accepted.11 Nonetheless, whether vol-
untary or not, the parties’ perception of a process’ fairness 
is important.12
Structural conflicts of interest can arise when design-
ing and implementing a sports dispute resolution system if 
there is insufficient separation of powers between those who 
adopt the rules, investigate allegations and appoint adjudi-
cators to hear the issue. Sports dispute resolution systems 
have typically developed organically under the control of a 
sports governing body. There may be a lack of resources and 
knowledge within the governing body on how to establish an 
independent and impartial dispute resolution system. Chal-
lenges to the fairness of a disciplinary or dispute procedure 
may require legal proceedings to be brought through the 
courts. However, many disciplinary proceedings or sports 
disputes involve volunteers or amateurs who may be reluc-
tant to challenge the dispute through the general court sys-
tem (if in fact it is permitted under the sport’s rules), when 
the costs of a legal challenge are taken into account. Also, 
the dispute may not involve large sums of money to be cost 
effective to challenge the system, even if there are important 
substantive and procedural rights at issue.
On the occasion where proceedings have been brought 
before a general court, the courts have shown judicial defer-
ence to a sports tribunal’s decision (which is not uncom-
mon in relation to other industry tribunal or disciplinary 
panel decisions).13 The courts recognise that sporting bod-
ies should be given, “as free a hand as possible, consistent 
with the fundamental requirements of fairness,”14 to organise 
their own disciplinary procedures without the interference 
of the courts. Sports panels have expertise and knowledge 
of the industry that usually place it in the best position to 
determine a sports dispute at first instance, and accordingly 
the courts provide a tribunal with a generous margin of 
appreciation in their decision-making. Nonetheless, while 
the courts appreciate that a sports tribunal has considerable 
expertise, there is recognition that “unthinking servile obei-
sance”15 to a sports tribunal’s decision is not appropriate, 
particularly where the decision under challenge affects a per-
son’s livelihood.16 Furthermore, recent judgements show the 
willingness of the courts to intervene when imbalances of 
power arise in certain contractual relationships, particularly 
employment relationships.17 A panel appointed by a sports 
governing body may be well-suited to determining the sub-
stance of industry disputes, but the structure and legal form 
in which the decision is made must still comply with the law.
Independence and impartiality are the hallmarks of a fair 
judicial process and also the rule of law.18 The independ-
ence of the process secures the impartiality of the tribunal 
or adjudicative forum in the minds of tribunal members and 
the public.19 Independence refers to the absence of any con-
nection between the tribunal or adjudicator and the executive 
or regulatory body that adopts, implements and enforces the 
rules. It also encompasses the ability of the adjudicator to 
form a view of the facts and reach a decision uninhibited by 
the influence of the structure or organisation around it. The 
extent to which structural independence of a judicial system 
is secured in a sports governing body depends on: the will-
ingness of a private sports governing body to relinquish con-
trol of the judicial function; the ability of other stakeholders 
to influence the structural form of the system; and the law.
Establishing an independent disciplinary and dispute mech-
anism is important for the legitimacy of sport as a self-regu-
lating industry. Procedural justice is premised on the notion 
that the legitimacy of authorities to govern is based upon the 
fairness of procedures used rather than the substance of their 
decisions.20 People may be more willing to accept a decision 
voluntarily when the decision made is fair.21 Four elements 
contribute to judgements about the fairness of a procedure, 
namely: the opportunity to participate in the decision-making 
process; the neutrality of the authority’s decision-making pro-
cess; the degree to which a person is treated with dignity and 
respect; and the cues that communicate information about the 
10 See summary in JW Budd, A Sojouner and J Jung (2017), 865.
11 Ibid 867.
12 Ibid.
13 For a discussion, see S Boyes, (2017).
14 Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1117, para 78.
15 McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 
(QB), para 37.
16 Ibid.
17 R(on the application of UNISON v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 
51; Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] ICR 1157; “It can no longer be 
said that Judges ‘turn a blind eye’ to the inequalities that abound in 
employment relationships”: A Bogg, (2018) 519.
18 L Neuberger, (2015)
19 Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 WLR 
781 (HL), para 38.
20 TR Tyler (2009) 187.
21 T Tyler (2000) 119.
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intentions and character of legal authorities with whom they 
are dealing – i.e. trustworthiness.22
Owing to the historical development of sports governing 
bodies, some sports’ dispute resolution systems have been 
designed without consideration of the views of stakeholders 
who may be subject to the process. Designing a dispute reso-
lution system that does not consider the views of those who 
are subject to it, may lead to criticism about the legitimacy 
of the process and problems with stakeholder “buy-in”. The 
opportunity to have the perspective of athletes, clubs, volun-
teers and others who are subject to the procedure involved in 
the procedure’s design or included on panels; the independence 
and impartiality of those making the decision; the degree with 
which the parties are subject to dignity and respect through-
out the process; and the trustworthiness of those involved, all 
contribute to the perception of a fair dispute resolution process 
and legitimise the governing body’s position in the industry.
The form of a disciplinary or disputes procedure, the 
forums which adjudicate the complaint, whether the forum 
is established as an arbitral tribunal or not, and who adju-
dicates cases, may be determined during the regulatory 
decision-making process. The extent to which stakeholder 
groups are consulted regarding the form of that procedure 
or the judicial structure will depend on the power and influ-
ence of stakeholder groups within the regulatory body. His-
torically, certain stakeholder groups have not been repre-
sented in sports regulatory decision-making processes and 
although it may be improving in some sports, it is difficult 
to gauge how these groups (for example, athletes, coaches 
or volunteers) have influenced the form and content of 
regulatory dispute resolution systems, if at all. Establish-
ing the adjudicatory structure as an arbitral process which 
limits the court’s review of the process to that permitted 
under national arbitration law, can also be problematic. It 
is generally thought that arbitration can be used to circum-
vent the protection of individual rights afforded by national 
law.23 It may also be viewed as inherently bias in favour of 
a governing body’s interests. According to Lord Neuberger, 
“any increase in freedom or power carries a concomitant 
increase in responsibility and an increase in arbitral pow-
ers must be accompanied by an increased responsibility to 
observe fundamental rights.”24
Article 6 of the ECHR is incorporated into national law 
in the UK through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) 
and affords a person the right to a fair hearing in an “inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law”. At com-
mon law, the principles of natural justice, specifically nemo 
iudex in sua causa (no judge should be a judge in his/her 
own cause), are also applicable to establishing requirements 
of independence and impartiality in any developed system 
of justice. The following section considers the application of 
Article 6 to sports dispute resolution procedures in the UK.
3  Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: the right to a fair 
hearing
At first glance, it may appear that a tribunal or panel whose 
jurisdiction is established under contract by a private sports 
governing body, is not subject to the ECHR. The ECHR was 
primarily enacted to control abuse of power by organs of the 
State. It is incorporated into national law through the HRA 
1998 and applies to public authorities—as that term is defined 
in s 6. It does not apply directly to sports governing bodies 
because these organisations are currently viewed as private 
entities.25 The ECHR, however, has indirect effect; the HRA 
1998 will apply even though a sports governing body is not 
viewed as a public authority because pursuant to s 6(3)(a) of 
the HRA 1998, the courts are required to act in a way that is 
compatible with an ECHR right. The court will be required to 
give effect to ECHR rights in a claim that challenges the sub-
stantive and procedural fairness of a sports tribunal process.
Even if a first instance tribunal does not comply with 
Article 6, then Article 6 may be satisfied so long as pro-
ceedings are subject to a review by a judicial body that does 
comply with Article 6 and has full jurisdiction to consider 
the law and the facts.26 The ECtHR’s position is that it is the 
totality of the procedure that is important for compliance 
with Article 6. The courts will consider whether the internal 
25 See, for example, R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, 
ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909 (CA), a case decided in the 
context of a judicial review claim.
26 Riepan v Austria App no 35115/97 (ECtHR, 14 November 2000), 
para 39; Gautrin v France (1999) 28 EHRR 196, para 58.
22 Tyler (n 20) 187-188; NH Rogers, (2013)
23 Neuberger (n 18) 278. Note that the public policy exception to 
enforcing foreign arbitral awards can play a role in ensuring that 
fundamental rights are maintained. See for example: Marco van der 
Harst, “Enforcement of CAS Arbitral Awards by National Courts & 
the Effective Protection of EU Law” in C Paulussen et al (eds) Fun-
damental Rights in International and European Law TMC Asser 
Press, The Netherlands 2016) chapter  12; A Rigozzi, (2010), 251; 
and Matuzalem v Fédération Internationale de Football Associa-
tion Case No 4A_558/2011 (Swiss Federal Court, 27 March 2012). 
See also the European competition law challenge to the International 
Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules that alleges that a requirement to 
submit to arbitration reinforces the restriction of an athlete’s com-
mercial freedom under European competition law: European Com-
mission Decision of 8 December 2017 Case AT 40 208 International 
Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules; appeal partially upheld in Case 
T-93/18 International Skating Union v European Commission [2021] 
4 CMLR 9; appeal pending to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union C-124/21 P International Skating Union v European Commis-
sion.
Footnote 23 (continued)
24 Neuberger (n 18) 278.
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disciplinary proceedings at issue produced a fair result or 
whether the defects that have infected the process have led 
ultimately to an unfair result. Overall, Article 6 will apply 
to sports dispute resolution proceedings unless the parties 
have agreed to waive its application, for example, through 
voluntary arbitration.
Article 6(1) guarantees the right to a fair hearing before 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
It has a civil and criminal limb and when considering chal-
lenges to a sports tribunal, the civil limb is relevant. To 
engage the civil limb of Article 6, a dispute at a national 
level is required between two private individuals—or an 
individual and the state—the outcome of which must be 
determinative of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations. 
In disciplinary proceedings, the ECtHR has previously held 
that disputes regarding the right to practise a profession give 
rise to disputes over civil rights and obligations.27 In the 
sports context, in Ali Riza and Others v Turkey,28 the ECtHR 
declared inadmissible applications brought by three ama-
teur football players against the Turkish Football Federation 
(TFF) on the basis that their dispute was not “pecuniary” 
in nature and did not involve the determination of a civil 
right or obligation.29 Since the amateur football players were 
unable to demonstrate that they earned a living from playing 
football, their dispute with the TFF did not have a pecuniary 
element and they were unable to challenge the one-year sus-
pension confirmed in the course of disciplinary proceedings 
before the Turkish Football Federation Arbitration Commit-
tee (TFF AC), an entity that the footballers claimed lacked 
independence and impartiality under Article 6(1).
Following Ali Riza, it may appear that all disputes involv-
ing amateur athletes now fall outside the scope of Article 
6(1), with the practical effect that a lesser standard of pro-
cedural guarantees may apply to dispute resolution sys-
tems that involve amateur athletes than those that involve 
professional athletes. The disciplinary cases considered by 
the ECtHR have in the main related to lawyers, doctors or 
regulatory entities that control entry into a profession for the 
purposes of earning a living only. Sports governing bodies 
regulate participation for professional and amateur athletes, 
the latter of whom generally participate in organised sport 
for recreational purposes and/or are defined as amateur 
under the sport’s rules. Whether an athlete is amateur or 
professional and the legal rights that attach to the status has 
been a longstanding argument raised in sports disputes.30 A 
disciplinary proceeding that bans an amateur athlete from a 
sport may not have as its primary decision-making purpose 
the determination of a civil right or obligation, but it is argu-
able that Article 6 may still apply because the consequence 
of that decision determines a civil right or obligation.31 
An amateur athlete may not be permitted to earn money 
directly from participation in the sport because of the sport’s 
rules but may earn money from participation in the sport in 
another capacity, e.g. as a paid coach, which arguably adds 
a pecuniary element to a dispute.32 It would depend on the 
object or objects of the dispute.
It is by no means certain that all dispute resolution pro-
ceedings involving amateur athletes are entirely excluded 
from the scope of Article 6(1). In Ali Riza, the circumstances 
of that case, meant that the amateur football players’ appli-
cations fell outside the scope of Article 6(1), but there may 
be other types of amateur athletes’ disputes that involve the 
determination of civil rights and obligations and are cap-
tured. In any event, it is preferable that sports governing 
body procedures adopt the highest standards applicable and 
not adjust the applicable procedural standards to the status 
of those who are the subject of proceedings. It adds cred-
ibility to the process, does not discriminate and ensures that 
procedural safeguards consistent with fundamental human 
rights apply to all who are subject to the procedure.
Article 6 also provides that a tribunal must be established 
by law. The jurisdiction of a sports dispute resolution system 
in the UK is typically established by contract and imple-
mented by a private sports governing body. The issue of 
whether a sports dispute forum is a tribunal established by 
law has yet to be substantively argued before the ECtHR 
and ECtHR jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of the 
phrase insofar as it applies to private entities exercising an 
adjudicatory function is limited. Generally, under ECtHR 
case law, it is recognised that a tribunal does not need to 
be integrated into the judicial machinery of a country in 
order for proceedings to be subject to Article 6, provided 
that it offers the appropriate guarantees.33 A body respon-
sible for determining a limited number of specific disputes 
27 Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 
1, para 48; Ali Riza (n 8) para 155.
28 Ali Riza (n 8).
29 Ali Riza (n 8) paras 155 – 156.
30 See Varnish v British Cycling Federation (t/as British Cycling) 
[2020] IRLR 822 (EAT); and Deliège v Ligue Francophone de 
Judo et Disciplines Associées ASBL (C51/96 and C191/97) [2002] 2 
CMLR 65.
31 See Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 455; cf Le 
Compte that confirmed a tenuous connection or remote consequence 
is not sufficient but that civil rights and obligations must be the object 
– or one of the objects of the dispute - and the result of the proceed-
ings must be directly decisive for such a right: (n 27) para 47.
32 See Deliège (n 30).
33 X v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 188, para 53; Rolf Gustafson 
v Sweden (1998) 25 EHRR 623, para 45
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may be defined as a tribunal for the purposes of Article 
6, if it provides those guarantees, for example, an arbitral 
tribunal.34 Specialist fora provide flexibility and expertise 
that can make the decision-making in certain disputes more 
cost effective and efficient and remove the dispute from an 
overburdened state justice system.35 It must, however, be 
a forum with the power of decision-making (e.g. have the 
authority to decide legal disputes with binding effects for 
the parties);36 determine matters within its jurisdiction, on 
the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in 
a prescribed manner;37 and comply with other substantial 
requirements of Article 6, such as independence from the 
executive and impartiality.38 In that regard, the ECtHR has 
held that established by law covers not only the legal basis 
of the existence of a tribunal, but also compliance with the 
particular rules that govern it.39
In the sports context, whether a sports dispute resolution 
panel or tribunal may be considered a tribunal established 
by law has not received substantive consideration by the 
ECtHR. In Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland40 whether the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport was a tribunal established by 
law, was not in dispute. The majority in that case were satis-
fied that it had the appearance of a tribunal established by 
law because it: emanated from a private foundation; had full 
jurisdiction on the basis of legal rules to determine disputes 
submitted to it; its awards resolved disputes in a judicial 
manner and could be appealed to the Swiss Federal Court; 
and the Swiss Federal Court recognised in its case law 
that CAS awards were comparable to national court judge-
ments.41 In that regard, the majority decision in Mutu and 
Pechstein establishes that it is sufficient for a tribunal to have 
the appearance of being established by law. The issue was 
also not disputed in Ali Riza and Others v Turkey,42 although 
in that case the relevant tribunal, the Turkish Football Fed-
eration Arbitration Committee (TFF AC), was established 
under State legislation in contrast to the privately established 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, which arguably strengthened 
the TFF AC’s position as a tribunal established by law.
A sports dispute forum in the UK is underpinned by regu-
latory rules that arise under a private contract and define its 
jurisdiction and procedure.43 It usually exercises a decision-
making power rather than advisory function, resolves cases 
in a judicial-like manner and its decisions are subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the general courts or can be chal-
lenged under the Arbitration Act 1996 (if it is established as 
an arbitration procedure). Although it is arguable whether 
the decision of a sports dispute forum is a proper judgement 
comparable to those of a national court, a sports dispute res-
olution panel or tribunal can certainly have the appearance 
of a tribunal established by law even if it is not underpinned 
by statute. The focus then becomes whether the forum com-
plies with all other elements of Article 6, particularly those 
of independence and impartiality.
Independence and impartiality are essential elements of 
Article 6. ECtHR jurisprudence establishes that independ-
ence involves a consideration of all the relevant circum-
stances, including: the manner of appointment of decision-
makers; the duration of the decision-maker’s term; the 
guarantees against outside pressure; and the appearance of 
independence (i.e. the standing of the tribunal and its proce-
dure).44 An impartial tribunal is organised with the absence 
of prejudice or bias. For the purposes of Article 6, impartial-
ity is determined according to a subjective test and an objec-
tive test.45 The subjective test considers whether the personal 
views and conduct of the decision-maker in a particular case 
demonstrated bias and partiality. The objective test considers 
whether the court offered guarantees sufficient to exclude 
legitimate doubt about partiality in an external observer, 
e.g. through the composition of the court or its freedom 
from influence.46 Objective impartiality and independence 
are closely linked and in some cases may be considered 
together.47 A tribunal must be independent and impartial 
both in substance and in appearance.48 The next section 
considers in further detail the two ECtHR cases that have 
discussed the requirements of independence and impartiality 
34 Lithgow and Others v the United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329, 
para 201; Mutu and Pechstein (n 7) para 149.
35 Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Mayer (n 27) para 51. In the UK, 
there is increasing encouragement for the use of certain types of alter-
native dispute resolution procedures before and during court proceed-
ings: see Civil Justice Council (2018)
36 Bentham v the Netherlands App no 8848/80 (ECtHR, 23 October 
1985), para 40.
37 Ali Riza (n 8) para 195.
38 Beaumartin v France (1995) 19 EHRR 485, para 36.
39 DMD Group v Slovakia App no 19334/03 (ECtHR, 5 October 
2010), para 59.
40 (n 7).
41 Mutu and Pechstein (n 7) para 149.
42 (n 8).
43 Sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom are independent 
of government and not part of a governmental system of regulation, 
although the system of rules that a sports governing body implements 
has been described as “a legislative code”: Enderby Town Football 
Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd and Anor [1971] 1 All ER 
215, 219.
44 Mutu and Pechstein (n 7) para 140 and cases cited in that para-
graph.
45 Mutu and Pechstein (n 7) paras 141–142.
46 Ibid.
47 Mutu and Pechstein (n 7) para 144.
48 Gautrin v France (n 26) para 58; Thaler v Austria (2005) 41 
EHRR 33, para 30.
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of dispute resolution systems in the sports industry at an 
international and national level, namely: Mutu and Pechstein 
v Switzerland; and Ali Riza and Others v Turkey.
3.1  Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland
Mutu and Pechstein considered the lawfulness under Article 
6 of disciplinary proceedings brought against two athletes: 
one a professional footballer and the other a professional 
speed skater. Mr Adrian Mutu was dismissed by his (then) 
employer Chelsea Football Club (Chelsea FC) after an anti-
doping sample that Mr Mutu provided tested positive for 
cocaine. A dispute ensued between Chelsea FC and Mr Mutu 
regarding whether the player had breached his employment 
contract without just cause within the meaning of Article 
21 of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of 
Players 2001 (FIFA RSTP 2001). The dispute was submitted 
for arbitration to the Football Association Premier League 
Appeals Committee (FAPLAC), which decided in April 
2005 that the player had breached his contract. Mr Mutu 
appealed the FAPLAC decision to the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS). CAS upheld the decision.
On the basis that Mr Mutu had been held to have breached 
his employment contract, Chelsea FC brought a breach of 
contract claim in the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, 
seeking damages for breach of contract. The Club succeeded 
and was awarded the sum of €17,173,990.00 in accordance 
with Article 22 of the FIFA RSTP 2001. Mr Mutu appealed 
the decision to CAS, which dismissed the appeal. In Sep-
tember 2009 Mr Mutu brought an application in the Swiss 
Federal Court to annul the CAS arbitral award in respect of 
the damages amount on a number of grounds, one of which 
was that CAS had not provided sufficient guarantees of inde-
pendence and impartiality.49 Mr Mutu claimed that one of 
the CAS arbitrators had failed to disclose that the arbitrator’s 
law firm represented the interests of the controlling owner of 
Chelsea FC. Furthermore, another of the CAS panel mem-
bers had presided over the CAS arbitral panel that had issued 
the first award in the dispute in favour of Chelsea FC. As 
a consequence, Mr Mutu argued that he had not received 
a fair hearing before an independent and impartial arbitral 
tribunal. The Swiss Federal Court disagreed, concluding in 
the circumstances that there were no justifications for find-
ing both arbitrators lacked independence or impartiality. Mr 
Mutu subsequently filed a claim against Switzerland in the 
ECtHR, alleging that he had been denied a fair hearing under 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR.
Ms Claudia Pechstein was a multiple speed skat-
ing Olympic Champion who in 2009 was held by the 
International Skating Union (ISU) to have used a prohib-
ited method of blood doping. A two-year period of ineli-
gibility followed. Ms Pechstein appealed the decision to 
CAS challenging the research and evidence that set the 
parameters for permissible haematological values, and 
asserting that a number of factors, including a genetic pre-
disposition to high haematological values may have caused 
the test result. Ms Pechstein also requested a public hear-
ing, but her request was denied and the hearing was held in 
private. The CAS upheld the ISU decision. Ms Pechstein 
appealed to the Swiss Federal Court to set aside the arbitral 
award on a number of grounds, including: the method for 
appointment of the arbitrators; comments made in another 
context by the presiding president of the CAS panel that 
he took “a hard line” on doping issues; and the absence 
of a public hearing. Her application was dismissed by the 
Swiss Federal Court whereupon Ms Pechstein filed a claim 
in the ECtHR, alleging that her right to a fair hearing under 
Article 6(1) had been infringed. Both Mr Mutu and Ms 
Pechstein claimed that the CAS could not be regarded as 
an independent and impartial tribunal. Ms Pechstein also 
claimed that she had been denied a public hearing. The 
majority in the ECtHR decision dismissed Mr Mutu’s claim 
and upheld Ms Pechstein’s claim that she was denied a fair 
hearing. It awarded Ms Pechstein damages of €8,000.00 in 
respect of the infringement; the arbitral decision remained 
extant.
The decision is important in the context of sports dis-
pute resolution design. First, it confirms that a dispute 
resolution system established in the sports industry as an 
arbitral procedure may in certain cases be characterised 
as compulsory arbitration and accordingly must afford the 
parties the safeguards secured by Article 6 of the ECHR. In 
Ms Pechstein’s case, the arbitration agreement was outlined 
in the ISU Regulations. Although Ms Pechstein was not 
required by general law to submit to arbitration, the law 
that applied was the ISU Regulations. The choice available 
to Ms Pechstein was to accept the arbitration clause or not 
accept the clause and face the prospect of not earning a liv-
ing from her chosen sport.50 On this basis, the Court con-
cluded that Ms Pechstein had not accepted the arbitration 
clause freely and unequivocally, and the proceedings before 
CAS were properly characterised as compulsory arbitration 
proceedings.51 The questions raised in Ms Pechstein’s case 
involved disputed facts, and the sanction imposed carried 
a degree of stigma that was likely to adversely affect Ms 
Pechstein’s professional honour and reputation.52 Accord-
ingly, in those circumstances denying a public hearing 
infringed Article 6(1).
49 Grounds for challenging a CAS award are set out in s 190 of the 
Private International Law Act (Switzerland).
50 (n 7) para 113.
51 (n 7) para 115.
52 (n 7) para 182.
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Mr Mutu’s situation, on the other hand, differed because 
the applicable FIFA regulations did not impose arbitration 
but left the choice of dispute settlement mechanism to the 
contractual freedom of the clubs and players. Although Mr 
Mutu argued that: all players at his club were obliged to 
accept the clause; it was commonplace in the football indus-
try to use arbitration; and it was only a notional possibility 
to bring the dispute to a national court, the ECtHR held 
that, on the basis of the evidence presented, Mr Mutu had 
freely accepted the CAS jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the fact 
Mr Mutu had challenged the arbitrator’s independence and 
impartiality during the proceedings demonstrated that he had 
not waived his right to have the case heard by an independ-
ent and impartial tribunal because he had not unequivocally 
accepted the CAS jurisdiction. The arbitration proceed-
ings to which Mr Mutu and Ms Pechstein were each a party 
needed to comply with Article 6 of the ECHR.
Secondly, the ECtHR confirmed that CAS is a judicial 
authority independent of the parties. CAS is a private adju-
dicatory forum, initially established by the International 
Olympic Committee and organised by ICAS, the Interna-
tional Council of Sports Arbitration. Ms Pechstein argued 
that the CAS lacked structural independence because of the 
method by which it was funded and the appointment mecha-
nism for arbitrators to the CAS Panel List applicable at the 
time that her proceedings were heard. CAS is funded by 
entities attached to the Olympic Movement and by arbitra-
tion fees. Drawing an analogy with the financing of national 
courts, the ECtHR concluded that CAS did not lack inde-
pendence or impartiality solely on account of the manner by 
which it was financed.53 Regarding the appointment mecha-
nism for CAS arbitrators to the CAS Panel List, the ECtHR 
acknowledged that at the relevant time, organisations which 
were likely to be involved in disputes with athletes had real 
influence over the mechanism for appointment of arbitrators, 
but it could not conclude that the arbitrators were objectively 
or subjectively biased.54 There was no breach of Article 6(1) 
on the basis of structural bias.
3.2  Ali Riza and Others v Turkey
The second case of Ali Riza and Others v Turkey considered 
whether dispute resolution bodies constituted at a national 
level in football in Turkey were independent and impartial 
for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The case 
involved five applications: an employment-related dispute 
between a professional player and a professional club; a 
dispute relating to a football referee whose position as ref-
eree was downgraded; and a dispute involving three ama-
teur players who were subject to disciplinary proceedings in 
relation to allegations of match-fixing. The cases involving 
the amateur players were rejected owing to the absence of 
any pecuniary effect for the amateur players, with the con-
sequence that the disciplinary proceedings did not involve 
the determination of a civil right sufficient to engage Arti-
cle 6.55 The ECtHR limited its substantive consideration to 
the cases of the professional football player, Mr Ali Riza, 
and the referee because these cases involved the applicants’ 
employment interests and consequently a determination of a 
civil wrong sufficient to bring the claims within the scope of 
Article 6(1). This journal article focuses on Mr Riza’s claim.
The player, Mr Ali Riza, had been employed in the 
top Turkish professional league by the club, Trabzonspor 
Kulübü Dernegi. In January 2008, Mr Riza left the club and 
returned home to the UK, 18 months into a contract that ran 
between January 2006 and July 2008. The dispute that fol-
lowed arose from the termination of his contract. The club 
alleged that he had left without notice, missed training with-
out permission and failed to return. It fined him the equiva-
lent of €109,523.00. The club lodged a claim in the Turkish 
Football Federation’s Dispute Resolution Chamber (TFF 
DRC), seeking damages of €153,670.00 for wrongful ter-
mination of contract, payment of the fine and a transfer ban 
to prevent Mr Riza taking up employment with another club. 
Mr Riza counterclaimed, alleging that the club had failed to 
pay him for more than four months, and seeking arrears of 
salary for the months of January 2008 to April 2008, match 
appearance fees for the first part of the 2007/2008 season, 
and match appearance fees that he would have received had 
the contract not been terminated .
The TFF DRC upheld the club’s claim and dismissed Mr 
Riza’s counterclaim. It ordered the player to pay the fine, pay 
damages for wrongful termination and suspended the ability 
of the player to sign for another club for four months. Mr 
Riza appealed to the Turkish Football Federation Arbitration 
Committee (TFF AC), which partly allowed the objection. It 
upheld the TFF DRC’s finding that Mr Riza had wrongfully 
terminated the contract, but reduced the amount Mr Riza 
had to pay to €61,596.00 and annulled the sanction which 
prevented Mr Riza from signing for another club. Mr Riza 
endeavoured to appeal to the CAS, which declined jurisdic-
tion. He appealed the CAS decision to the Swiss Federal 
Court, which dismissed the appeal. In 2011, Mr Riza then 
brought a challenge in the ECtHR, alleging an infringement 
of Article 6(1) of the ECHR.
Mr Riza argued that the proceedings before the TFF AC 
were compulsory arbitration proceedings and infringed 53 (n 7) para 151.
54 Note the view of the dissenting judgement that the CAS appoint-
ment mechanism showed CAS had no appearance of independence: 
(n 7) dissent, para 11. 55 (n 8) paras 155-156.
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Article 6(1) because the TFF AC was not an independ-
ent and impartial tribunal as required under the civil limb 
of Article 6(1). On the compulsory arbitration issue, the 
ECtHR, drawing on Mutu and Pechstein, agreed that pro-
ceedings before the TFF AC were compulsory arbitration 
proceedings because a national law in force in Turkey at the 
relevant time provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
TFF AC in football disputes. There was no option to bring a 
dispute to a civil court. Accordingly, proceedings before the 
TFF AC had to provide the procedural safeguards afforded 
under Article 6.56
To understand the arguments relating to the TFF AC’s 
lack of independence and impartiality, it is useful to under-
stand the Turkish Football Federation (TFF)’s governance 
structure. At the relevant time, the TFF was established by 
national law as an autonomous entity, governed by private 
law principles, with a separate legal personality to regulate 
all aspects of professional and amateur football in the coun-
try. The TFF’s main bodies were the Congress, Board of 
Directors and the Legal Committees, of which the TFF AC 
was the highest judicial appellate body. The TFF’s govern-
ance structure was outlined in further detail in the TFF Stat-
utes. The Congress was the TFF’s principle decision-making 
body and adopted the TFF Statutes, which prescribed how 
the organisation operated. The Congress also appointed the 
Board of Directors which in turn issued Directives governing 
the functions of various bodies, and the administration and 
discipline of football (for example, the Arbitration Direc-
tive). The Board of Directors also had the power to appoint 
the TFF AC members and determine the TFF AC members’ 
remuneration, expenses and allowances payments. The dura-
tion of appointment of the TFF AC’s members was the same 
as that of the Board. TFF AC members had a duty to decide 
cases in an independent and impartial manner as prescribed 
under the national law. Of importance, was the fact that 
under the relevant national law and the TFF’s Arbitration 
Directive, the TFF AC’s decisions were final and could not 
be challenged to the general court, even by way of challenge 
similar to a domestic arbitration award.
Mr Riza argued that the TFF AC lacked independence 
and impartiality because in contractual disputes between a 
club and player, the players and clubs did not have equal 
influence in the TFF AC composition. Only a small number 
of delegates represented the players’ interests in the Con-
gress; the majority represented the interests of the clubs. As 
the Congress elected the Board of Directors which in turn 
elected the TFF AC members, the Board of Directors and 
the TFF AC were effectively controlled and managed by the 
clubs and it could be argued that the TFF AC had an implicit 
bias towards clubs. In addition, the TFF AC members had 
the same term of office as the Board of Directors; the inter-
nal rules of procedure were determined by the Board of 
Directors; there were no procedural safeguards to protect 
TFF AC members from outside pressures; the TFF AC was 
located in the TFF headquarters and TFF staff carried out 
administration and secretarial work for the TFF AC; and the 
TFF AC had no separate legal personality or budget.
The ECtHR upheld Mr Riza’s claim. In the majority’s 
view, the manner of appointment of TFF AC members did 
not in itself undermine independence and impartiality pro-
vided that once appointed the TFF AC members were not 
subject to pressure, did not receive instructions from the 
Board of Directors and were able to perform their duties with 
complete independence.57 As there was no evidence that the 
Board of Directors had instructed the TFF AC members to 
perform their duties in a particular way, the ECtHR consid-
ered the procedural safeguards in place to allow members 
to decide a case independently. It concluded that there were 
strong organisational and structural ties between the Board 
of Directors and the TFF AC that indicated a significant 
level of influence of the Board of Directors over the TFF AC. 
These features included the following: the Congress and the 
Board of Directors generally consisted of those representing 
the interests of the football clubs; TFF AC members were 
not required to disclose circumstances affecting their inde-
pendence and impartiality; there was no specific procedure 
for the parties to a dispute to challenge a TFF AC member’s 
appointment; the remuneration amounts were determined 
by the Board of Directors (although drawing on Mutu and 
Pechstein, the ECtHR pointed out that the financial arrange-
ments were not on their own sufficient to conclude that there 
was a lack of independence or impartiality); the term of the 
TFF AC members was “unduly aligned” with the term of the 
Board of Directors; TFF AC members were not immune to 
legal action arising in connection with a discharge of their 
duties; and TFF AC members were not bound by profes-
sional rules of conduct and were not required to take an oath 
or make a declaration before taking up their duties.58
The ECtHR then considered whether the TFF AC con-
sisted of members who could be regarded as objectively 
or subjectively independent and impartial when compared 
with the entities that were likely to be a party to a dispute. 
It concluded that in contractual disputes between clubs 
and players, the composition of the Congress and Board 
of Directors as favouring clubs may be considered to “tip 
the balance in favour of clubs” in proceedings between a 
player and a club before the TFF AC.59 Decisions poten-
tially set a precedent which could influence other disputes 
57 (n 8) para 209.
58 (n 8) paras 210-216.
59 (n 8) para 219.56 (n 8) para 181.
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of a similar nature between clubs and players. In regulatory 
disputes, structural deficiencies such as the vast powers of 
the Board of Directors over the TFF AC in the absence of 
strong safeguards protecting the TFF AC members from out-
side pressure meant there was an absence of independence 
and impartiality.60
For these reasons, the ECtHR concluded that the TFF 
AC was not organised in a way so as to ensure its inde-
pendence from the Board of Directors, and national law 
provided no safeguards to protect members of the TFF AC 
from outside pressure and enable it to perform duties with 
independence.61 It upheld the applicants’ complaints and 
determined that an infringement of Article 6(1) of the ECHR 
had occurred. It awarded €12,500.00 to each applicant in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage.62 It did not award pecuni-
ary damage because it could not speculate on the outcome 
of the proceedings had the TFF AC been independent and 
impartial.63
On an individual level, although the applicants won their 
claim to the ECtHR on different grounds in Mutu and Pech-
stein and in Riza, neither Ms Pechstein nor Mr Riza had 
the original decisions overturned or received pecuniary 
awards that represented their actual losses. The amounts of 
€8,000.00 and €12,500.00 that Ms Pechstein and Mr Riza, 
respectively, obtained were nominal when compared to the 
likely overall pecuniary loss each athlete suffered. In that 
regard, it may be viewed as a pyrrhic victory for the indi-
vidual athletes. The cases highlight some important features 
that are relevant to the independence and impartiality of a 
sports dispute resolution forum and these are discussed in 
the following section.
3.3  Independence and impartiality in sports 
dispute proceedings
Mutu and Pechstein and Riza are important cases in the 
context of sports dispute resolution design. Both cases 
confirm that a regulatory sports dispute resolution system 
that is designed as an arbitration procedure may, in certain 
circumstances, be characterised as compulsory arbitration 
proceedings. If compulsory arbitration, then proceedings 
must guarantee the safeguards secured by Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR, including the right to a public hearing. Riza, in 
particular, is extremely useful for highlighting the factors for 
consideration when seeking to establish an independent and 
impartial judicial structure in sport. These include:
• The mechanism for appointing a list of panel members to 
a specific dispute resolution body must provide for a bal-
anced panel membership. Although a feature that is not 
on its own sufficient to found an argument that a panel 
lacks independence and impartiality, the requirement to 
ensure that there is balanced membership is important. 
When appointing members to a panel list, consideration 
needs to be given to the types of disputes that a panel 
member will likely consider and the interests support-
ing the appointment of those individual members so that 
the panel composition may not be perceived as unduly 
favouring one side of the dispute over the other. Adver-
tising panel roles to appoint panel members from a wide 
recruitment pool can be a way to provide a balanced and 
diverse independent panel membership.
• Panel members must be able to undertake their decision-
making free from external influence. The types of fea-
tures that can protect a dispute resolution forum from 
allegations that panel members are under the influence 
of other entities within the sports governing body’s 
structure include: an immunity from legal action (e.g. 
a procedural rule that indemnifies a panel member if 
legal action arises from a decision); assurance that panel 
members are not instructed how to decide a case; lengthy 
terms of tenure for panel members that do not coincide 
with appointments to other controlling entities within the 
governance structure; a requirement that panel members 
make a declaration of independence prior to joining the 
list; a requirement that panel members hold membership 
to another professional body, e.g. a legal professional 
body.
• A procedure for challenging individual panel appoint-
ments and disclosure is required. A procedural rule that 
requires an individual panel member to disclose circum-
stances affecting their independence and impartiality and 
a specific procedure for the parties to challenge a panel’s 
appointment can assist with demonstrating the independ-
ence and objective impartiality of a particular panel.
• Protection from influence for individual panel members 
is required. Unlike judges who have legal immunity 
for their decision-making, panel members appointed to 
adjudicate sports dispute proceedings do not have legal 
immunity from civil or criminal action arising from their 
decision-making. If the dispute resolution body is estab-
lished as an arbitral panel or tribunal with a seat in Eng-
land and Wales, then arbitrators may be able to benefit 
from the protections afforded under s 29 of the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996. Some sports governing bodies may be 
in the financial position to provide indemnity insurance 
cover for panel members. A requirement that panel mem-
60 (n 8) para 223.
61 (n 8) para 241.
62 (n 8) para 249.
63 (n 8) para 246. Note the partly concurring partly dissenting deci-
sion of Judge Bosnjak who pointed to a line of existing author-
ity which permits the ECtHR to speculate on outcomes in certain 
circumstances and award an amount for pecuniary loss: (n 8) paras 
16-19.
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bers have their own professional indemnity insurance or 
utilising an appointing body that has professional indem-
nity insurance may also provide the necessary protection.
So far, Mutu and Pechstein and Riza have not been subject 
to consideration in national courts in the UK, although there 
have been some cases that have challenged the structure of a 
sports dispute resolution forum under Article 6 or the com-
mon law doctrine of apparent bias.
4  Common law challenges to sports dispute 
resolution systems
Stretford v Football Association Ltd and Anor64 is at present 
the only case to substantively consider the alleged infringe-
ment of Article 6 in a sports dispute resolution procedure, 
specifically an arbitral procedure. In that case, Mr Stretford, 
a players’ agent, applied for and was granted a Football Asso-
ciation (FA) players’ agent’s licence in April 2002 under the 
licensing regime for players’ agents that existed at the time. 
The face of the licence recorded that, “the holder of this 
licence agrees to abide by the rules and regulations of FIFA, 
the Football Association, the FA Premier League and the 
Football League”. The FA Rules are published yearly in the 
FA Handbook and contain an arbitration agreement in Rule K.
In June 2005, the FA issued disciplinary proceedings 
against Mr Stretford. Before the proceedings could be heard, 
Mr Stretford filed a High Court claim alleging, amongst other 
things, that the disciplinary proceedings would not comply 
with Article 6 of the ECHR. In its defence, the FA requested 
a stay of the High Court proceedings on the basis that Rule K 
required any dispute regarding the proceedings to be referred 
to arbitration. In defence of the stay application, Mr Stretford 
argued that he was not bound by the arbitration agreement 
contained in Rule K on the grounds that, inter alia: it was 
not incorporated into a contract between him and the FA; 
and it was “null and void” under s 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 
1996 because it conflicted with Article 6 of the ECHR.65 Mr 
Stretford asserted that Rule K did not comply with Article 
6 because the arbitrator appointment mechanism called into 
question the independence of the arbitrators and Rule K pro-
hibited public disclosure of the award.
The High Court disagreed with Mr Stretford and granted 
the FA a stay of proceedings under the Arbitration Act 1996, 
whereupon Mr Stretford appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal held that Rule K was incorporated into 
the contract between the FA and Mr Stretford and that by 
agreeing to Rule K: both parties waived their right to a hear-
ing before the courts (except in accordance with the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996); and had waived the right to a public hear-
ing.66 On the issue of whether Rule K conflicted with Article 
6 of the ECHR, the Court confirmed that when the parties 
voluntarily enter into an arbitration agreement they waive 
their rights under Article 6.67 To be an effective waiver, 
however, it must be without compulsion or constraint, and 
not run contrary to the public interest.68 On the facts of the 
case at hand, the Court of Appeal concluded that Rule K 
was “not in any sense required by law or compulsory.”69 It 
noted that:70
“an arbitration clause has become standard in the 
rules of sporting organisations like the FA. The rules 
regulate the relationship between the parties, which 
is a private law relationship governed by contract… 
Clauses like Rule K have to be agreed to by anyone, 
like Mr Stretford, who wishes to have a players’ 
licence, but it does not follow that the arbitration 
agreement contained in them was required by law 
or compulsory. To strike down clauses of this kind 
because they were incompatible with Article 6 on that 
basis would have a far-reaching and, in our opinion, 
undesirable effect on the use of arbitration in the con-
text of sport generally.”
The Court of Appeal stated that the ECtHR jurisprudence 
did not explain the meaning of “constraint” and that exist-
ing principles of the common law and equity were relevant, 
e.g. principles of duress, undue influence, mistake and the 
requirement for onerous and unusual terms of the contract 
to be brought to the attention of the other party.71 It con-
cluded that English Law fully protected parties who were 
compelled to enter into an arbitration agreement because 
of “constraint”. It also concluded that there was no issue 
regarding constraint in Mr Stretford’s case.72 Furthermore, 
there was no suggestion that Rule K was counter to any 
71 Stretford (CA) (n 64) para 53.
72 Ibid. See criticism of the finding in U Haas, (2012)
64 Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch); deci-
sion upheld on appeal in Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2007] 
Bus LR 1052 (CA).
65 Section  9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that: “On an 
application under this section the court shall grant a stay unless sat-
isfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or 
incapable of being performed.”
66 Stretford (CA) (n 64) para 66.
67 The Court referred to X v Federal Republic of Germany (App No 
1197/61) [1962] 5 YB 88; R v Switzerland (1987) 51 DR 83; Deweer 
v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439; and Nordström-Janzon and Nord-
stöm-Lehtinen v The Netherlands (1996) 87 ADR 112.
68 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439.
69 Stretford (CA) (n 64) para 49.
70 Ibid.
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important public interest; if anything, the public interest 
encouraged arbitration in cases of this kind.73 The Court of 
Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision to grant a stay of 
legal proceedings.
In light of Mutu and Pechstein and Riza, it is very likely 
that proceedings under Rule K, together with other arbitra-
tion agreements in the regulations of UK sports governing 
bodies, would be characterised as compulsory arbitration 
proceedings with the effect that Article 6 applies.74 Mr 
Stretford was faced with the choice of accepting the arbitra-
tion clause and earning a living as a sports agent in football 
or not accepting Rule K and refraining from working as a 
sports agent in football. Applying Mutu and Pechstein and 
Riza, such a choice is not a free and unequivocal choice to 
agree to arbitration under Rule K.
National law has a role to play in considering whether a 
breach of Article 6 arises in a case concerning arbitration 
proceedings.75 Unlike Riza where the TFF AC’s decision 
was final and unable to be challenged in the general court 
under national law, domestic sports arbitration proceedings 
are subject to supervision by the courts through the Arbitra-
tion Act 1996. The Arbitration Act 1996 ensures that courts 
can oversee the provision of a fair hearing by an impartial 
arbitral tribunal.76 It also provides for greater access to a 
court than other arbitration laws in some other countries.77 
The only provisions of Article 6 not formerly met by the 
Arbitration Act 1996 are the requirements that: a hearing 
be held in public; membership of the tribunal be independ-
ent; the tribunal be established by law; and that judgement 
be pronounced quickly.78 The Court of Appeal in Stretford 
did not consider substantively whether the arbitral tribunal 
that was to be formed under Rule K, was a tribunal estab-
lished by law. It proceeded “on the assumption that an arbi-
tral tribunal is not a tribunal established by law, within the 
meaning of Article 6” and looked at whether the parties had 
waived Article 6 altogether, which it concluded they had. 
The legal basis for sports adjudicatory forums to which Arti-
cle 6 applies still remains uncertain.
The common law doctrine of apparent bias has also been 
used to challenge the impartiality of a sports tribunal. The 
test for apparent bias is stated in the leading case of Por-
ter v Magill,79 and requires consideration of “whether a 
fair minded and informed observer, having considered the 
relevant facts, would conclude that there was a real possibil-
ity of bias”.80 It is considered to be in line with the ECtHR’s 
assessment of objective impartiality.81 Issues regarding the 
independence of a dispute resolution procedure may be rel-
evant to determining objective impartiality.
The test was applied in the context of sports dispute reso-
lution procedures in Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing 
Club Ltd82 and McKeown v British Horseracing Authority.83 
In Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd, a grey-
hound trainer challenged a decision of the National Grey-
hound Racing Club Limited (NGRCL) to reprimand and 
fine him £400.00 for administering hexamine, a prohibited 
performance enhancing substance, to a dog contrary to the 
racing rules of the NGRCL. Mr Flaherty successfully argued 
that the decision was invalid because one of the stewards, 
appointed by the NGRCL to determine whether there had 
been a breach of the racing rules, showed apparent bias. 
On appeal the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court 
finding on the basis that the steward’s prior relationship, 
professional connections and views expressed at the inquiry 
did not, on an objective analysis, demonstrate apparent bias. 
Establishing apparent bias is specific to the facts of a case. 
It involves first ascertaining the facts on which the sugges-
tion of bias is based; and, secondly, making an objective 
appraisal of those facts.84 In McKeown v British Horserac-
ing Authority,85 the High Court rejected an argument that a 
horseracing disciplinary panel and appeal panel were bias. 
There was no evidence of actual or apparent bias and Mr 
McKeown’s argument that the panels demonstrated appar-
ent bias because the panels had reached an unreasonable 
conclusion or made an unreasonable finding of fact, was 
wrong in law.86
Apparent bias was also an issue in Modahl v British Ath-
letic Federation (No 2),87 albeit on facts that arose prior to 
the adoption of the HRA 1998 and the House of Lords’ deci-
sion in Porter v Magill. Ms Modahl, a GB representative 
athlete, claimed damages from the British Athletic Federa-
tion (BAF) (as it was then known) as a result of the BAF’s 
alleged breach of an implied contractual obligation to select 
members of a disciplinary committee who would be impar-
tial and free of bias. Modahl had been subject to disciplinary 
proceedings following a positive drug test at an international 
athletics meeting in Lisbon in 1994. A disciplinary commit-
tee decided she had committed an anti-doping rule violation, 
73 Stretford (CA) (n 64) para 66.
74 N deMarco, (2018)
75 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439.
76 See Arbitration Act 1996, ss 24, 33, 67 and 68.
77 Arbitration Act 1996, ss 67, 68 and 69.
78 Stretford (CA) (n 64) para 38.
79 [2002] 2 AC 357 (HL).
80 Ibid para 103.
81 Magill (n 79) para 103.
82 [2005] EWCA Civ 1117.
83 [2010] EWHC 508.
84 Flaherty (n 82) para 27.
85 [2010] EWHC 508.
86 McKeown (n 83) paras 327 and 335.
87 [2001] EWCA Civ 1447.
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a decision that was overturned on appeal on the basis of new 
evidence. The essence of Ms Modahl’s case was that the 
first instance disciplinary committee was tainted by bias. 
The success of her damages claim relied upon finding that 
a contract existed between her and the BAF that contained 
a term in relation to disciplinary proceedings that the BAF 
had breached and which had caused her damage.
The Court of Appeal accepted that on the facts of the 
case, a contract arose between Ms Modahl and the BAF 
which included a term that the BAF would carry out disci-
plinary procedures in accordance with its rules and under-
take to carry out the disciplinary process fairly. The scope 
of the term extended to a consideration of whether the end 
result of the process was fair and not in respect of each indi-
vidual stage.88 As Latham LJ expressed, “the test is whether 
having regard to the course of the proceedings, there has 
been a fair result”.89 Latham LJ acknowledged that there 
may be cases in which owing to corruption, bias or some 
other deficiency the end result may not be described as fair, 
however, “the question in every case is the extent to which 
the deficiency alleged has produced overall unfairness”.90 
On the facts of Modahl, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
the process as a whole had produced a fair result, notwith-
standing apparent bias on the part of one member of the first 
instance disciplinary committee.91 This is consistent with the 
ECtHR’s approach that Article 6 may be satisfied even if a 
first instance body does not comply with Article 6, provided 
proceedings are subject to a review by a judicial body that 
does in fact comply and has full jurisdiction to consider the 
law and the facts.
5  Conclusion
Mutu and Pechstein and Ali Riza and the other common 
law cases highlight the factors that secure the independ-
ence and impartiality of a dispute resolution process which 
is organised within a sports governing body to ensure that 
the proceedings are fair, namely the need for a separation 
between regulatory and adjudicative functions, and inde-
pendent and impartial appointments to a dispute resolution 
panel. This is easy to achieve in larger sports governing bod-
ies; slightly more difficult in small or medium-sized ones 
where resources are an issue. The cases also highlight the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal basis of a forum organised 
under the auspices of a private sports governing body that 
adjudicates dispute resolution proceedings to which Article 
6 applies. The legal basis for such a forum is only one aspect 
of whether a tribunal is established by law; the other is the 
requirement for the forum to comply with all other elements 
of Article 6, including those of independence and impartial-
ity. It elevates the importance of sports dispute resolution 
proceedings being independent and impartial.
One way of resolving the issue is to underpin the entire 
UK sports dispute resolution system by a statutory frame-
work that establishes a separate UK Sports Tribunal or 
requires all UK sports governing bodies to utilise an inde-
pendent entity such as Sports Resolutions UK for dispute 
resolution. This would satisfy the need for independence 
and impartiality in dispute resolution procedures as well as 
remove uncertainty as to whether a forum currently in place 
is a tribunal established by law. Sports governing bodies 
should also be encouraged to agree dispute resolution proce-
dures with those who are likely to utilise the dispute resolu-
tion system, particularly if the proceeding is an arbitration 
procedure.
It is difficult without auditing all sports dispute resolu-
tion systems to know just how many satisfy the minimum 
threshold of independence and impartiality required by Arti-
cle 6. There are some very good models of sports dispute 
resolution in some governing bodies, but the system as a 
whole is fragmented and not all sports are sufficiently well-
resourced to provide the procedural guarantees or the level 
of independence required for a fair hearing. Furthermore, 
in addition to the adjudication function of sports disputes, 
there are other aspects of complaint handling in sport such 
as access to justice for sports participants, whistleblowing 
and investigations that have been highlighted as requiring 
reform.92 Now, may be the opportune time to reconsider the 
sports dispute resolution model in the UK.
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